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The Need for Quinean Pragmatism
in the Theory of History
Jonathan Gorman
 
Historical and Philosophical Stances
1 Suppose  we  speculated  that  there  was  some  connection  between  pragmatism  and
philosophical theorising about history. How might we investigate whether that was so? A
claim that there was some such connection might be interpretable as a factual if vague
assertion that pragmatists share an interest in philosophical theorising about history.
Given  this,  and  seeking  more  exactness,  we  might  well  need  first  to  identify  our
“pragmatists”: pragmatism has a long and complex tradition that has been expressed in
multifarious, even inconsistent, ways, and we might well find that only some pragmatists
have, or have had, this interest. Perhaps we would find ourselves addressing the interests
only of some past – to be clear, historical – pragmatists; perhaps only some present ones;
perhaps, indeed, all, regardless of date. Yet even if only present-day pragmatists were
involved and the imagined factual claim (about their interest in philosophical theorising
about history) were expressed in the present tense, this assertion would nevertheless, not
at all implausibly, be warranted by historical methods, that is, warranted by informed and
scholarly reading of relevant texts and other interpretable remains.
2 While it is true that such methods are commonly, even necessarily, used in historical
research, the reference here to “historical methods,” and the particular characterisation
of them just mentioned, might suggest that we here presuppose the view that “history”
should  be  conceived,  even  exhaustively  conceived,  as  a  particular  kind  of  epistemic
discipline.  Yet  how  “history”  should  be  conceived  is  a  controversial  part  of  what
“philosophical theorising about history” involves. Philosophical readers might well be
suspicious that the view that history is an epistemic discipline would itself be an outcome
of  philosophical  theorising  about  history,  and  was  not  a  conclusion  to  be  taken for
granted. They would be right, on both counts. However, while it is appropriate to be alert
to such matters, we do not yet need to determine or presuppose any connection with
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theorising about “history,” for we need at this point only the notion of scholarly reading,
and can safely recognise that historians, including historians of ideas, are usually well
trained  in  that,  whatever  else  is  involved.  Here  are  two  possible  outcomes  of  such
imagined scholarship in the present context,  offered as possible truths warranted by
informed  and  scholarly  reading  of  relevant  texts  and  other  interpretable  remains:
Morton White, a pragmatist, was interested in philosophical theorising about history.1
W. V. Quine, another pragmatist, was not.2 We need no more examples than just these two
to make two simple points: the connection between pragmatists and being interested in
philosophical theorising about history now seems “accidental” or “contingent,” in the
philosophical senses of those words: at least one pragmatist is, at least one pragmatist
isn’t, and the contrast is cast in terms of the pragmatists’ individual psychologies (how
“interested”  they  were  in  philosophical  theorising  about  history).  We  seem to  need
further “historical” investigation into particular pragmatists to take the matter further.
3 However, we may suppose that we are philosophers rather than historians, although it
remains to be seen how sound that separation is.  An elementary distinction between
philosophy and history is illustrated in the following: we may imagine historians to ask,
for example, if some particular pragmatists were interested in philosophical theorising
about history; we may suppose philosophers to ask instead if pragmatism is “intrinsically
connected” to philosophical theorising about history. Philosophers and historians alike
seek “truth,” but perhaps of different things: historians seek truth about who believed
what; philosophers seek truth about connections between ideas, where who had those
ideas may be incidental. Philosophers thus sometimes address the “history of philosophy”
– past philosophers – in what seems a peculiarly philosophical rather than a historical
way. Here is Peter Strawson: “when I refer to the system of Leibniz, I shall not be much
concerned if the views I discuss are not identical at all points with the views held by the
historical philosopher of that name. I shall use the name ‘Leibniz’ to refer to a possible
philosopher at least very similar to Leibniz in certain doctrinal respects; whether or not
they are indiscernible in these respects matters little.”3
4 Unusually explicit among philosophers about this matter, Strawson intended by this to
block any complaints against his references to “Leibniz” that he imagined might be made
by  “proper”  historians.  He  believed  that  the  “proper”  historians’  sense  of  historical
scholarship,  as  involving  the  grounding  of  historical  assertions  with  appropriate
historical evidence, material that they interpreted with accuracy and respect,4 was not
relevant to what he was engaged in. Philosophical scholarship required instead exactness
of  expression  and  respect  for  logical  reasoning.5 Philosophers  like  Strawson  (and  a
number of pragmatists are like Strawson) saw themselves as engaging in a dialogue with
“possible philosophers,” with the analytically improved constructs of past philosophers;
they  thought  about  an imagined improved world  where,  unlike  the  actual  historical
world,  the  people  were  not,  as  they  saw it,  made  of  straw.  Historians,  by  contrast,
characteristically  thought  that  one could not  get  much more straw-like than merely
imaginary people.
5 We  would  need,  I  have  suggested,  further  historical  investigation  into  particular
pragmatists to recover any interest of theirs in philosophical theorising about history.
However, following Strawson, claiming that pragmatists have an interest in philosophical
theorising  about  history  clearly  need  not  be  a  genuine  description  of  some  actual
pragmatists’  psychological  dispositions.  Moreover,  despite  Strawson’s  attitude  to  the
history  of  philosophy,  the  claim  need  not  even  be  the  ascription  of  a  rationally
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constructed attitude to (some) analytically improved relevant possible pragmatists.  It
may be, rather, a comment on the intrinsic (arguably, stipulated) nature of pragmatism
“itself”; it would not at all be the outcome of miscalled “historical” research, imaginary or
otherwise. On the contrary, setting the historical question as “did the pragmatists Morton
White  and  W. V. Quine  have  an  interest  in  philosophical  theorising  about  history?”
presupposes  that  White  and  Quine  were  “pragmatists,”  a  judgement  that  (given  the
supposed  contrast  with  historians)  only  philosophers  could  make,  for  it  is not  a
judgement  made  on  historical  evidence  (assuming  that  to  require  some  highly
constrained derivation from past texts) but is, rather, and relative to that, “a priori” in
some way.6
6 Whether  White  and  Quine  were  “pragmatists”  requires  an  understanding  of  what
philosophers think of as (a relevant part of) the history of philosophy. It is very usual for
philosophers  to  think in  a  context  of  ideas  set  by  what  they  see  as  the  history  of
philosophy. But then, it is very usual for historians to address what seems to be exactly
the  same  context  of  ideas,  and  they  use  the  very  same  texts  for  the  purpose  as
philosophers do. Philosophers and historians alike would seem to need to know what was
meant by the texts in question, and, given similar skills in interpretation, this suggests we
might find it difficult to distinguish the disciplines.7 However, we could try to force a
distinction in the following way, by importing a certain theory of meaning: a philosopher,
in order (for example) to assess the grounds of its truth or the validity of its deduction
from others, might well ask what a particular sentence in the text means, and will often
think of that as a matter that is determinable independently of any “context,”8 which
they might well deliberately ignore; the historian, by contrast, might well ask what the
author of the text meant, and think that to be a matter that depends – even depends in its
entirety – on the “actual context” of its being said.9
7 However,  this  is  not  a  very useful  way of  making a  distinction between history and
philosophy. Many historians, whatever their interest in some form of “context,” suppose
that they do not need a “theory of meaning” to make sense of their evidence, for they
often think, as some philosophers had thought pre-war,10 that what a person meant by
uttering certain words was neither more nor less than the meaning of the words in that
utterance.  Historians  often  treat  an  utterance  as  having  a  transparent  meaning
independently of its context, much as a philosopher would commonly treat a statement
of mathematics.  It  is  usually philosophers rather than historians who are aware of  a
contextual  approach  to  meaning  (even  if  they  rarely  use  it  for  statements  of
mathematics).11 For example, followers of the later Wittgenstein think of “meaning” as
“rule-governed,” so  that  a  case  for  philosophy being indistinguishable  from a  social
science is arguable,12 while other philosophers of language have developed “speech act
theory.” As explained by Strawson in referring to J. L. Austin: “Given that we know […]
the meaning of an utterance, there may still be a further question as to how what was said
was meant by the speaker, or as to how the words spoken were used, or as to how the utterance
was to be taken or ought to have been taken.”13
8 Yet  we  should  note  here  Strawson’s  firm  distinction  between  “the  meaning  of  an
utterance” and the other, “further,” features of the “meaningful” situation. He did not
take or allow the more radical step of holding that we do not know “the meaning of an
utterance” unless we know how what was said was meant, or how the words spoken were
used, or how the utterance was to be taken or ought to have been taken. What view do, or
should  (for,  following  Strawson,  we  may  need  to  improve  the  expression  of  their
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positions), pragmatists take about this? While they may well have a larger vision than
Strawson,  it  matters not,  at  this  point.  If  “the meaning of  an utterance” is  available
independently of “context” – whatever “context” is – it is available to philosophers and
historians alike, who can share access to the ideas involved. Conversely, if “the meaning
of an utterance” is not available independently of “context” then, again, philosophers
and historians alike have access to meaning on whatever basis is involved.
9 It would be mere dogma on philosophers’ part to insist that historians do or should deal
only  with  the  contingent  psychological  characteristics  of  past  individuals  (their
“interests”),  while philosophers alone are entitled to assess the (logical,  epistemic or
metaphysical) merits or “truth” of the substantive contents of the thoughts they had;
historians regularly do that sort of thing despite any such insistence. After all, the actions
historical individuals engaged in likely bore a close relation to the substantive contents of
the  thoughts  they  had,  and  how meritorious  those  thoughts  were  might  well  be  of
historical relevance requiring historians’  judgement.  While the history of pragmatism
often displays serious practical engagement with the world in which pragmatists found
themselves, it would be a mere contingency if some philosophers did not often act much
on the basis of their own ideas, where the content, however better in quality than the
usual run, did not generate in them sufficient confidence to warrant their acting, so that
those philosophers became historically irrelevant. For my part, I think of myself as being
pragmatic when I allow historians to invade my philosophical space, while – as will be seen
– I equally think myself able to dip in and out of history as I choose. There is plainly some
overlap between philosophy and history where “meaning” is concerned, and any interest
in philosophical theorising about history may also be an interest in metaphilosophical
theorising about philosophical inquiry. But that bathetic conclusion says nothing that
relates  especially  to  or  involves  a  commitment  to  pragmatism,  although  some
pragmatists may well form a view about it.
10 Here I will highlight a point I will make use of later: in so far as “meanings” are not to be
understood as fixed eternal quasi-mathematical objects appropriate for more abstract
theorising then we should note  some  degree  of  temporal  extension  to the  “meaningful”
features of the situation to match the temporal extension of the local “context” involved.
This may well seem to open the door to a full historicising approach, but in fact most
analytical philosophers shunned what they saw as a risk of relativism and chose not to
take that route. Analytical philosophers did not notice or think relevant any temporal
duration of speech acts, usually continuing to suppose that the sentences uttered in such
a  meaningful  context  had  some  fixed  meaning,  while  where  the  context  allowed  a
“thicker” meaning – such as in Austin’s ‘performative utterances’14 – they were thought
to be atemporally  analysable  in such terms as  an utterer’s  “intention” or  a  hearer’s
“uptake,” notions which were themselves atemporally analysable. It was difficult to find
analytical  philosophers  or  even  concerned  historians  moving  beyond the  temporally
immediate where “meaning” was concerned. Theorising about meaning took place from
what I have called elsewhere a “philosophical stance,”15 as if the theorising were dealing
with quasi-mathematical objects.
11 Nevertheless,  whichever discipline has the skills most appropriate for answering it,  a
question remains open to us: is there an “intrinsic” connection between pragmatism and
philosophical theorising about history? Here, in so far as that is possible, we direct our
attention to the ideas referred to in the question. If we have also to attend to the persons
alleged to have held those ideas, or to the “contexts” in which the ideas were thought or
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expressed, so be it. One way or another, we can examine – analyse – these ideas, it seems.
One point is readily apparent: if there is some intrinsic connection between pragmatism
and philosophical theorising about history then there seem to be at least three forms it
could  take:  pragmatism requires  attention  to  philosophical  theorising  about  history;
attention to philosophical theorising about history requires us to adopt pragmatism; both
of  these.  Given the multifarious versions of  “pragmatism,” not  least  the existence of
Quine’s philosophy, it would be unnecessarily heroic to assert the first form of “intrinsic
connection” here, and since the third form includes the first, a similar objection can be
made  to  that.  Rather,  in  the  present  essay  it  will  be  shown  historically  (indeed,
autobiographically) how philosophical theorising about history required in practice the
adoption of a particular version of pragmatism.
12 As already remarked, it is very usual for philosophers to think in a context of ideas set by
what they see as the history of philosophy, and we propose to enter here this world of
ideas. We need not, however, limit ourselves to the world of “philosophical” ideas, for our
concerns with “meaning” affect the world of ideas imagined on the basis of education or
memory or of empirical evidence or historical remains or “reason” more generally: our
“history” in a more full-blooded sense;16 indeed, we are likely to imagine here not just the
past but also the present and we often think of history as continuing into the future. Now
it may be that we believe, following Strawson for example, that philosophical analysis
enables us to abstract from this overarching context the ideas that we propose to address
and  analyse,  that  is,  we  can  attend  to  particular  sentences  in  texts  and  take  their
meanings as fixed and sufficiently transparent to us so that they are identifiable and
reidentifiable in whatever other small contexts we find them or use them as our own. It
may well be that (some) pragmatists would not allow such “abstraction.” Nevertheless,
however we attend to the ideas at issue and however “free-standing” it is appropriate to
think them, in practice we pick them out from a welter of other ideas we might attend to
instead. This world of ideas – this ongoing history – is imagined to be temporally extended.
Philosophy about “history” in this sense is not necessarily philosophy about “history”
conceived as an epistemic discipline.  We conceive our situation here as involving an
object of thought – the context of a welter of thoughts (possibly inseparable from each
other)  constituting ongoing history including the history of  philosophy –  that  has  a
duration well beyond the immediate, and both philosophers and historians can feel at
home in it. My “pragmatism” here is therefore tolerant.17 As philosophers, as historians of
philosophy, or as historians, the temporally extended object that one is thinking about
here is  essentially  mentally  “observable”  as  fixed,  enduring,  continuing,  changing or
becoming, perhaps with temporally distinct and moveable parts, perhaps not, perhaps
with an internal structure, perhaps not, perhaps evolving, perhaps not. There would have
been no evolution for Plato’s Forms.
13 We  thus  adopt here  what  I  have  called  elsewhere  a  “historical  stance,”18 which
characteristically has as its object of thought something which is imagined to spread over
an indeterminately longish period of imagined time. However, one does not have to be
any  kind  of  theorist  or  historian  to  adopt  it,  for  it  is  a  stance  appropriate  to  the
experienced temporal continuity of our everyday lives. An apparent disadvantage of this
point is that, precisely in so far as the world of history is continuous with the everyday,
an adequate philosophy of the “everyday” – maybe some form of pragmatism – might be
an  adequate  philosophy  of  history  too,  and  attention  to  the  philosophical  issues
particularly  concerned  with  “history,”  in  particular  with  “history”  conceived  as  the
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discipline of historiography, might well be able to be bypassed. In any event, this ongoing
“historical” world is one of the imagination or consciousness. Despite the Cartesian thought
that  imagination  and consciousness  are  private  to  the  individual,  here  they  are  not
private but essential features of our shared world, just as meaningful language itself is. It
is  not,  of  course,  imaginary;19 it  is  real time  that  is  imagined.  Those  like  Strawson
theoretically inclined to traditional philosophical analysis may well imagine a temporally
extended,  yet  temporally  immediate  because  also  eternal,  quasi-mathematical  shared
world  of  reidentifiable  meanings  that  are,  following  Frege,20 fixed  (or  at  least
comparatively determinate in any flexibility they are supposed to have), whereas those
inclined to the “historical” may imagine a shared world that is temporally extended and
structured in terms of concepts that can cover change and can themselves change, even,
with Bakhtin, change in some extreme way.21 On the other hand many historians share a
commonsense, if not naïve, view that “meanings” can be taken for granted as broadly
unchanging,  whereas  it  is  the  philosophical  speculators  who  see  revolutionary
possibilities here.22
 
From History to Hate: Redescribed Recollections
14 Given this world of ideas we propose to enter, where should we begin? “In treating of […]
ideas, whatever order we adopt has its own disadvantage,” wrote F. H. Bradley.23 This is
because “there is not and there can not be any such thing as a mere idea, […] standing or
floating by itself.” “Really,  here as elsewhere,  what in every sense comes first  is  the
concrete whole, and no mere aspect, abstracted from that whole, can in the end exist by
itself.”24 As Louis O. Mink put it,  “despite the fact that an historian may ‘summarize’
conclusions in his final chapter, it seems clear that these are seldom or never detachable
conclusions.”25 It is a “ruinous superstition,” Bradley concluded.26 With these and similar
arguments Bradley justifies his view at the beginning of his The Principles of Logic, first
published in 1883, that “It is impossible […] to know at what point our study should
begin.”27 Yet Bradley is pragmatic at least in this sense: he is going to try: “[…] If we incur
the reproach of starting in the middle, we may at least hope to touch the centre of the
subject.”28 He would see if it worked.29
15 With the help of my imagination informed by memory – or maybe it is the other way
around30 – I will now enter this temporally extended world of ideas around 1970, when I
embarked on postgraduate research into the analytical philosophy of history.31 For me, in
this bit of personal academic history, the problems involved in philosophical theorising
about history came before I gave any attention to pragmatism. But I was not at all sure
whether the problems were epistemic, or metaphysical, or logical, or even political, and I
was not at all  sure whether the problems had to do with history as a “discipline” as
opposed to “history” in one of its many other senses. Indeed, I had no idea at all what the
problems  ought  to  be  conceived  to  be.  Beginning  in  wonder  and  doubt,  like  many
intending philosophers I was tempted by the desire to start addressing from scratch those
matters about which one may be curious or astonished.32 But where was “scratch”?
16 It lies not so much in either wonder or doubt themselves, or even in the things wondered
about or doubted, but rather in the recognition that these worries – indeed, puzzlements
and disagreements of many kinds – need to be dissolved, resolved or overcome. That is a
pragmatic thought.  It  lies  in  the  recognition  that  such  matters  be  investigated  as
necessary and appropriate,  inevitably  with assumptions  made about  the form of  the
The Need for Quinean Pragmatism in the Theory of History
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
6
investigation and about where any burden of proof lies, assumptions that are themselves
likely to generate controversy. Descartes thought that “scratch” in such recognition was
“here” and “now,” and interpreted those as referring to his immediate and personal
consciousness and such unavoidable and undeniable thoughts as he found it to contain,
with philosophically “rationalist” criteria for the latter,  generating the view that the
dissolution of doubt and the overcoming of puzzlements involved particular perennial
issues that required universal and permanent solutions, reflecting the eternity that God,
mathematics and for that matter Plato’s Forms, occupied, and defining also the nature
and limits of the philosophical. There seemed nothing in Descartes’ consciousness that
was temporally extended in a historical sense, or indeed in any sense other than the
“eternal,” and nothing that was shared with others.
17 Problems generated by the “here” and “now” in a more mundane sense – temporally
localised compared to eternity, no doubt temporary and changeable – were beneath the
ken of those reflecting on the eternal, so that, for example, “history, expelled from the
body of knowledge proper by Descartes in part I of the Discourse, is still regarded with
suspicion by his successors today.”33 Hume, long thought of as primarily a historian, 34
started his philosophy in much the same place as Descartes but with “empiricist” criteria,
interpretable as assuming that it was the “here” and “now” of individual phenomenal
experience  that  marked  “scratch,”  and  to  some extent  he  shared  with  Descartes  an
understanding of the limits of the philosophical. Commonly evaluated as if it offered a
new and different range of solutions to Descartes’  supposedly perennial philosophical
questions,  Hume’s  philosophy was  in  the  light  of  Descartes’  work usually  ascribed a
sceptical character, but his history “is recognizably within a classical tradition of dealing
with public affairs and public men.”35 Usually thought of as distinct in some principled
way,  how  Hume’s  philosophy  and  history  are  connected  is  an  intriguing  question,36
although that will not be dealt with here.
18 Perhaps supreme among philosophers, Kant sought a rapprochement between rationalism
and empiricism, but like many historical philosophers before and after him the issues he
addressed were set by his forebears.37 His “here” and “now” included those inherited
issues. He set still more puzzles for his successors, particularly when he attempted to
apply pure reason to the course of history,38 and my “here” and “now,” when I began to
research in  philosophy,  included many of  those  puzzles.  None of  these  philosophers
helped me much at the time, not least because “scratch” in post-Wittgenstein 1970 was
widely  accepted  by  philosophers  as  meaningful  language  in  a  shared  world.
Understanding  this  need  not  involve  Wittgenstein’s  “rules,”  but  a  science  of  human
behaviour seemed highly relevant and most of  us were “pragmatists” in at least one
sense: said Charles Sanders Peirce, “It is not ‘my’ experience but ‘our’ experience that has
to be thought of”;  as Bryce Gallie summarised this,  “language is essentially a vehicle
whereby one expresses those parts of one’s experience that are general, that must be
‘ours’ rather than ‘mine’ if they are to be communicated at all.”39
19 I came to research in this area with a fairly sound grounding in the history of philosophy
and with a background of study in philosophy of history.40 At that time the philosophy of
history  was  distinguished  into  two  areas.  In  the  usage  of  W. H. Walsh,  these  were
“speculative” and “critical” philosophies of history.41 In the usage of Arthur Danto, these
were  “substantive”  and  “analytical”  philosophies  of  history.42 “Speculative”  or
“substantive” philosophy of history had had a comparatively benign past prior to the
twentieth century. The “meaning” of history has been a perennial worry for humanity,
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expressing as that issue can a concern about our past, present and future, with religion
often understood to give the historical “meaning” sought, characteristically telling us
“why we are here” or “what we are for.”43 During and since the Enlightenment,  and
beginning  with  Biblical  exegesis  using  skills  first  learnt  in  studies  of  classical  texts,
historical  understanding had been developed in ways distinct from religion,  with the
“meaning” of history conceived as a subject for rational and secular attention rather than
being a matter for religious authority. We may summarise Vico from 1725: “Because, as a
species, we have ‘made’ history and the social world, we – humanity or its representatives
– have the capacity to transform both.”44 That we can only know what we make – verum
factum – is an even briefer summary of his epistemological position. That thought offers
an opportunity for a pragmatic approach.
20 However, by the Second World War it came to be held that “speculative” or “substantive”
philosophy  of  history,  thought  of  as  a  historicist  precursor  of  various  forms  of
totalitarianism undertaken in the name of “progress,” was a misconceived if  not evil
activity that had been well demolished, in then current theory at least, by Karl Popper,45
and – thanks also to the publicly defended pluralism of Isaiah Berlin – it was thoroughly
out of tune with the time. Patrick Gardiner had been able to write an introductory book in
the area without referring to speculative philosophy of history at all;46 Walsh, who had
published  his  Introduction one  year  earlier  than  Gardiner,  had  felt  it  necessary  to
apologise in case it was thought to be speculative.47 I was familiar with the thought of
Collingwood,48 Bradley,49 and various works by historians, which were most commonly (it
then seemed to me) the result of philosophically untutored reflections in their dotage,
although  Herbert  Butterfield’s  The  Whig  Interpretation  of  History was  a  distinguished
exception to that  judgement,50 while I  had some of  the most  advanced philosophical
discussions with the historian Maurice Cowling.
21 Inevitably,  one was allowably engaged only in “critical” or “analytical” philosophy of
history.  While philosophy of  science at  this period engaged with big epistemological,
logical  and  metaphysical  issues,  these  were  not  open  to philosophers  of  history.
Analytical  reflection about big philosophical  issues did not require attention to what
historians got up to or to what they thought.51 The nature of historical “facts” seemed
problematic, but nobody supposed that one needed any more than current philosophy of
science to address the epistemic difficulties involved here,52 while there would be no need
for a pragmatist approach in philosophy of science unless one were already committed to
it. Five works particularly set the scene for me in 1970: Carl Hempel’s “The function of
general laws in history,”53 William Dray’s Laws and Explanation in History,54 Bryce Gallie’s
Philosophy and the Historical Understanding,55 Arthur Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of History,56
and Morton White’s Foundations of Historical Knowledge.57
22 All  these  were  concerned  with  the  nature  of  historical  explanation,  and  allowable
philosophy of history seemed to consist of nothing else. Hempel imposed his empiricist
philosophy of science on historical writing using a Humean model of causal explanation,
while the historian Dray objected to this by arguing for the role of reasons in historical
explanation. Causes versus reasons in the explanation of human action was an ancient
debate  that  continues  today,  but  –  almost  to  prove what  a  backwater  philosophy of
history had become once it had lost its evil speculative edge – as this debate became once
again more philosophically valuable it morphed into the philosophy of action58 and left
behind  philosophers  of  history.  It  was  not  as  if  historians  explained  human actions
particularly well, and the place for debate, if anywhere outside core philosophy, would
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have been in psychology or the philosophy of the social sciences or, as earlier noted, the
philosophy of the “everyday.”
23 Gallie, Danto and White, by contrast, highlighted “narrative,” which seemed to be a kind
of explanation quite different from what the scientists produced. One knew a “narrative”
when one saw it: historians produced them at a great rate and each of them had lots of
sentences in it. Gallie saw such stories as “followable” and harked back to the romantic
philosophies  of  around  1800.  These  were  difficult  to  grip  in  terms  of  analytical
philosophy, and left one with an uncomfortable feeling that there had to be more to
narratives than a large collection of facts organised in an entirely aesthetic way; even
Danto’s valuable and arguably pragmatic “rules of redescription” covering what he called
“narrative sentences” seemed in the last resort to be aesthetically driven.59 Aesthetics, it
was commonly assumed at the time, could not possibly have any epistemic role.60
24 Danto and White, in subtly different and clever ways, tried to make analytical sense of
narratives mainly by offering – indeed forcing on them – a version of Hempel’s so-called
covering-law  theory  of  causal  explanation  as  modelling  the  constitutive  links  that
supposedly tied together the explanatory elements of narratives. That just seemed to me
to be an unnatural fit (were there “constitutive links” that needed to be modelled?), but
then there was no other theory of explanation available (and should it be a theory of
explanation that I  required?).  Putting these concerns aside for a while,  I  threw myself
instead into the fast developing work at Cambridge in the History and Philosophy of
Science  Unit,  where,  apart  from  exciting  developments  in  empiricist  philosophy  of
science, like many other research students I studied in depth and tried to make sense of
the  works  of  Kuhn, Quine  and  Feyerabend,61 while  cracks  appeared  in  the  received
understanding  of  empiricist  philosophy  of  science.62 But  while  my  understanding  of
history and philosophy of science became better informed and more sophisticated, I was
still unable to unpack the dimly perceived philosophical confusions that making sense of
“history” seemed to require.
25 Historians  took  their  positions  seriously,  more  seriously than  current  philosophical
understanding of their discipline made plausible.  While they often agreed on “facts,”
their invective against each other was educational and entertaining beyond the ordinary,
and the deep-rooted differences between them clearly went far beyond mere matters of
aesthetic or even political choice. “It’s hate,” I heard at a recent colloquium of historians.
63 Philosophers  might  differ  on fundamental  as  well  as  stylistic  issues  too,  but,  even
though  there  was  among  them  the  occasional  threat64 and  ad  hominem bullying  in
seminars was not uncommon, by contrast historians in general left the philosophers far
behind in depth of feeling and mastery of vicious language. On what is for me now a
memorable afternoon I went to the Library of Peterhouse (then in an attic and not the
grand affair it is now) to search out, if I could, two historical accounts of much the same
thing that were in such clear opposition to each other that I might be able to identify the
philosophical issues I only dimly saw. Indeed, I later came to realise that it was opposition
that was the issue and that it was staring me in the face.
 
Joyce and a Synchronic View of Quine
26 I knew that A. J. P. Taylor had annoyed a lot of fellow historians, so I started with his
English History 1914-1945.65 Noteworthy was his account of William Joyce, otherwise known
as “Lord Haw-Haw.” Joyce had been charged with high treason on the 17th September
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1945,  it  being  alleged  that  “he  being  a  person  owing  allegiance  to  the  King,  did
traitorously adhere to the King’s enemies in Germany by broadcasting propaganda.”66 He
was found guilty, this was upheld on appeal, and he was executed at Wandsworth Prison
on  3rd  January  1946.  Taylor  dealt  with  this  matter  in  a  little  detail,67 observing
“Technically,  Joyce  was  hanged  for  making  a  false  statement  when  applying  for  a
passport, the usual penalty for which is a small fine.”68 I could see well enough that a
remark like this could not plausibly be a contribution to historical knowledge, and was
best ignored (after all, “technically” he was hanged for what he was charged with); on the
other hand there was much apparently truthful  information in Taylor’s  account that
seemed – before one saw any contrasting account – both to express and to warrant his
pro- rather than anti-Joyce view.
27 After puzzling over the Library shelves for a while I found a suitable anti-Joyce foil to
Taylor  in  Chambers’  Encyclopaedia:  “William  Joyce,  1906-46,  traitor  […]”  Taylor  and
Chambers gave me the brief narrative accounts, for and against Joyce, that I required.
However, each needed considerable revision to remove tendentious, morally judgemental
or  “ideological”  sentences,  false  implications  and  implicatures,  and  other  features
similarly epistemically problematic, and this left me with a number of sentences that
were, on the face of it, true, or – if one is unhappy with “truth” – at least well warranted
in normal historiographical terms. An important consideration in my next move was this:
against F. H. Bradley’s view that “there is not and there can not be any such thing as a
mere idea,  […]  standing  or  floating  by  itself,” 69 I  knew  that  analytical  philosophy
permitted me to ignore any original context of other sentences70 and allowed me to take
each  sentence  as  a  free-standing  whole,  move  it  about  and  juxtapose  it  with  other
sentences as I thought fit, subject only to avoiding any inconsistency in the outcome. So
far as current analytical logic and epistemology were concerned each sentence, wherever
it was placed, would carry with it undisturbed whatever truth-value it had, or whatever
epistemological warrant it had. Given this assumption, I formulated the following pair of
accounts, selecting from Taylor and Chambers:
(A) “Joyce was born in Ireland, according to the application for a British passport
made  by  him  in  1933.  He  became  a  Fascist,  for  whom  Sir  Oswald  Mosley,  the
‘Bleeder,’  was too moderate.  In  August  1939,  a  few days before the outbreak of
hostilities, he went to Germany and offered his services to the German ministry of
propaganda. He was the Germans’ principal English broadcaster (known as ‘Lord
Haw-Haw’ from his manner of speaking). He was executed as a traitor.”
(B) “Joyce was born in New York. His father was a naturalized American citizen.
Joyce never made a formal request for British nationality, though he spent most of
his life in England and was regarded as patriotic. In September 1940 he became a
naturalized German. Joyce attracted to himself the mythical repute of Lord Haw-
Haw. These legends were the manufacture of  war-nerves.  He was executed as a
traitor.”71
28 These are  brief,  but  that  is  sufficient  for  the argument.  It  is  not  apparent  from the
superficial text alone whether these short accounts are fictional or historiographical, but
that is not here relevant. What does matter is that they are offered as factually true: an
exact  analysis  shows  that  every  sentence  in  each  of  the  two  accounts  is  indeed
individually true, or (for those who prefer it) at least accepted by historians as warranted
by the historical evidence. They were sourced in an appropriately historical way. One
issue is what historians characteristically mean when they think of an account being true.
There is no doubt that a part of this is that the individual sentences of the account should
each severally be thought of as true, but that is not enough. Removing tendentiously
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expressed  sentences  and  the  like  had  not  avoided  the  obvious  feature  that  there
remained highly tendentious selection – why, for example, leave out of the (B) account of
Joyce  reference  to  his  having  been  the  Germans’  principal  English  broadcaster,  and
include only a reference to the mythical stories about Lord Haw-Haw (and there were
some)? – but it was precisely this need for the selection to be itself truthful that I had to
address.
29 It  seemed  clear  to  me  that  objective  “selection”  required  rational  grounds  for
determining the relevance of sentences,  and that holding it to be merely an aesthetic
choice  was  utterly  implausible.  The  problem  was  surely  in  some  way  epistemic.
“Explanation,” by contrast, seemed for a moment to offer an answer: it is plain that the
(A) account does, and the (B) account does not, explain in a followable way why Joyce was
executed as a traitor. But “explanation” is an unsupportable criterion of truth, knowledge
or  cognate matters.  Sir  Walter  Scott  saw it  clearly:  “were we to point  out  the most
marked distinction between a  real  and a  fictitious  narrative,  we would say  that  the
former, in reference to the remote causes of the events it relates, is obscure, doubtful,
and mysterious; whereas, in the latter case, it is a part of the author’s duty to […] account
for everything.”72 Explanatory clarity is no guide to truth; for Scott it was a sign of fiction.
Intriguing for a moment was the thought that a logical argument73 is also a selection of
sentences, and here a “truthful” selection might be cashed in terms of validity. Perhaps
there was a rational analogue for validity where historical accounts were concerned? Yet
it is elementary logic to distinguish validity from truth, and the validity of an argument
says nothing whatever about the truth of  its  constituent statements.  This  suggestion
seemed to me to be one among many dead ends.74
30 I later found that Ernest Nagel had said that “it is not inconceivable that each of two
historical accounts of the same period could contain only indisputably correct statements
about matters of particular (or ‘simple’) fact but that each would nevertheless be marked
by a distinctive bias.” However, he continued, “the argument hardly warrants a wholesale
skepticism toward the possibility of historical objectivity.”75 But I had no doubt that my
examples proved that that is exactly what it did. What made the matter epistemic in some
centrally  important  sense  was  that  the  (A)  and  (B)  accounts  were  incompatible,
inconsistent with each other in some historiographical  way.  No historian,  indeed,  no
ordinary reader, could accept them both as true. At least one of them – quite probably
both of them – had to be false, and one was not going to find that falsehood in one of the
constituent  sentences.  Despite  every  sentence  in  each account  being  consistent  with
every other sentence in both accounts, the selections of sentences presented as they were
involved two meaningful but incompatible or inconsistent “wholes.”
31 While each sentence had a “truth-value” and an epistemological warrant that did not
vary  with  the  context  of  other  sentences,  just  as  current  analytical  logic  and
epistemology permitted (indeed, was committed to), nevertheless there was a sense of
“whole account truth” that then current analytical logic and epistemology did not and, I
later came to see, could not recognise. Yet the situation was in one sense “logical,” for
there seemed no reason why one could not use the elementary tools of propositional logic
in dealing with the unit of meaning that a “whole account” expressed. On the other hand,
I came to see later that one could not use the tools or the assumptions of predicate logic. I
argued for the need for a philosophy enabling us to reason with respect to “relevance,”
understanding  that  as  being  a  quality  of  a  sentence  that  changed  according  to  the
historical account – the context of surrounding sentences, at least – that contained it.
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“Statements do not carry a ‘relevance-value’ with them just as they carry a truth-value,
regardless of where they appear.”76 “Whole-account-truth” was clearly historical truth in
an important way but it was not truth-functional relative to its constituent sentences.
One could not usefully treat a historical account as a conjunction. This, then, was the
epistemically problematic dimension of historiography. Received empiricist philosophy
of science offered no help, I argued in 1974.77 I then spent a while trying to make sense of
sets of sentences in terms of set theory, but that too I came to think a dead end.
32 In due course I was tempted, not particularly to use “pragmatism” as a general resource
for this problem, but at least to use Quine’s conception of what later was called the “web
of belief.” In contrast with Hume’s position, on Quine’s approach in “Two dogmas” we
hold  that  our  beliefs  look  for  their  warrant,  not  to  particular  experiences,  but  to
experience “as a whole.” The web initially looked to me like sets of sentences, just as a
historical account did, and it seemed as if that conception might be fruitful. Following the
“impossible term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume,” Quine had famously said that
“what I am now urging is that even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our
grid too finely. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science.”78 That was a
powerful – indeed blinding – thought. Later I reflected, as it seemed to me that Quine
quite plainly had not (at least, not in a serious way), that it was a pragmatic question how
large a “unit of empirical significance” was to be taken to be, and that we could hence
treat narratives as a central unit for the purposes of the epistemology of historiography.
Quine clearly had no recognition that  the notion might be used in this  way.79 While
Quine’s pragmatist philosophy may not look historicist and was plainly not intended to
be,  successors of his such as Richard Rorty drew out some historicist  implications of
pragmatism,  although  not  especially  with  any  epistemic  issues  relating  to  historical
accounts in mind;80 after all, the “everyday” was sufficient. 
33 For Quine in “Two dogmas,” experience alone warrants no particular beliefs as certain.
We are to recognise that no one of our beliefs is so fully and directly related solely to
experience that we are forced to keep or amend just that one if experience requires it.
Equally, what we choose to treat as a priori is not a matter independently given to us by
the demands of pure reason or anything of the kind, for reason does not itself generate
substantive beliefs. Quine recognises that, in trying to make sense of the experienced
world, there is room for conscious and deliberate decision regarding which sentences we
propose to hold true and which we propose to discard as false. It is open to us to amend
our knowledge claims as we find pragmatically convenient, and there are in principle
many ways of effecting any required change. As Isaiah Berlin put it, “Any one proposition
or set of propositions can be shaken in terms of those that remain fixed; and then these
latter in their turn; but not all simultaneously.”81 As Quine put it, “Any statement can be
held true  come what  may,  if  we make drastic  enough adjustments  elsewhere  in  the
system.”82 Again, “no statement is immune to revision,”83 so it is not merely that “there is
much latitude  of  choice,”84 but  that  unlimited adjustment  to  the  web of  beliefs  is  in
principle available.85
34 If Quine is right here then it is not the “statement” or the Lockean or Humean “term” or a
particular “belief” that is the unit of empirical significance but rather some meaningful
“whole,” whether “the whole of science” or, as I saw it, just that “whole” consisting of a
particular historical narrative understood as a set of sentences. I felt I could take from
Quine at this point his explicit holistic view that particular beliefs are constrained by
their relationship to other beliefs within our total set of beliefs. We can then describe the
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set  of  beliefs,  sentences  or  statements  as  he  does,  as  a  “web”  of  beliefs,  with  such
implications of constraint and stickiness as the word “web” suggests. The web of other
beliefs are the sole constraints upon a particular belief, and are equally the only source of
validation or justification for that belief. For the sets of sentences in historiographical
accounts, the “beliefs” I argued to include such sentences as express the evidence or the
“historical sources” for them. These characteristically appear in footnotes to the account,
so that the selection of sentences involved in producing a historical account are more
than appear in the explicit narrative in the main text but includes also roots in the much
larger world of historical “ideas,” sources themselves very often also of narrative form.
35 Yet what makes this “whole of science,” or “whole historical account,” true, rather than
merely being a free-floating and false construction? Quine himself did not take to heart
his  own  assertions  in  “Two  dogmas,”  for,  against  his  view  that  the  term  and  the
individual statement were not “units of empirical significance,” we find him in Word and
Object86 introducing the notion of “stimulus synonymy” which looks like nothing so much
as  a  route  to  permitting  the  causal  stimulation  of  belief,  hinting  that  reality  is
independent of our conceptualisation and comes in “units of empirical significance” that
are in belief-sized bits. Now it may well be, once we have allowed that it is a pragmatic
matter what the “unit of empirical significance” is, that the whole of science, a historical
account and an individual  sentence can each be “units  of  empirical  significance” for
different purposes, and even a fragmented view of our minds, our shared consciousness,
may become appropriate. But this makes it implausible to suppose that one or other of
these units is epistemically fundamental relative to the others. That analytical philosophy
generally,  and  even  Quine  himself,  currently  assumed that  some version  of  “atomic
sentences” was indeed fundamental was an unfortunate context for trying to make sense
of what was going on in the expression of historical knowledge.
36 Apart from what seemed to me to be an incoherence in Quine’s position at this point, the
difficulty for the epistemology of history was that “grounding” selections of sentences in
such terms took one back to the old, and failed, view that historiographical truth involved
a unified synthesis of  independently available atomic facts.  First  get your facts,  then
select them “properly.” But no ground for synthesis seemed available, while Quine’s view
that the web involved some constraint on a particular belief because “Any statement can
be held true come what may,”87 if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system
” offered no more constraint than “consistency” between sentences or beliefs. This might
(although it probably didn’t) work for short sentences and the like, which pragmatically
we could allow in certain contexts or for certain purposes to be our “units of empirical
significance,” but the requirement of such consistency was already met in the (A) and (B)
accounts,  and it  was  consistency  between  statements that  Quine  clearly  (although
inconsistently)  had in mind here,  rather than consistency between “units  of  empirical
significance,” as – pragmatically – we could take historical accounts to be.
37 Berlin’s expression of a similar position in terms of “propositions” involved a similar
failure. Consistency between accounts was not only different from consistency between
their constituent propositions or statements, it did not even require it, for statement-truth,
while clearly desirable,  I  had shown to be not  even a necessary condition for  whole-
account-truth.88 The old idealist idea of “degrees of truth” seemed tempting, although I
did not follow through with that thought. Irrelevant falsehoods, like irrelevant truths,
had no relevant cognitive content, while even a false statement (most obviously where
the error was trivial) could be relevant and be an essential feature of the whole true
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account. This failure of a particular kind of compositionality occurred in both directions.
Just  as  one cannot assure oneself  of  whole-account-truth on the basis  of  constituent
statement truth, so one could not assure oneself of constituent statement truth on the
basis of whole-account-truth. Bradley was right when he said “what in every sense comes
first is the concrete whole, and no mere aspect, abstracted from that whole, can in the
end exist by itself,”89 although he had slightly overstated the point, for while analysing or
breaking  up  the  “whole”  provided  no  assurance or warrant whatever of  constituent
statement truth and might well result in falsehood, it was not a necessary outcome, for
the conclusion was not a matter of principle but of practice. One might be accidentally
lucky to extract some true sentence, but even then one had no assurance of its relevance,
the crucial epistemic ground for the expression of historical knowledge.
 
A Diachronic View of Quine
38 There was a further important point: I came to realise that in worrying about how the
web was to be understood and structured I was myself adopting a synchronic view of it,
much it seemed as Quine and everyone else did, and that I was thereby adopting what I
called earlier here a “philosophical stance.” It was necessary to take much more seriously
the idea that the web should be understood as temporally extended: Quine’s “web of
belief” should be conceived in diachronic and historiographical terms as a rolling web. Just
as Quine had said, “To learn ‘apple’ it is not sufficient to learn how much of what goes on
counts as apple; we must learn how much counts as an apple, and how much as another,”
90 we needed to think of the rolling web as a web of reality-sorting expressions,91 where
“expressions” referred not necessarily to terms or sentences or beliefs but, for historical
meaning and truth, to narrative length units of meaning that counted or sorted shared
experience  in  various  ways.92 Matters  such  as  representation  or  reference  had
subordinate status and were to be analysed in such terms.
39 We can now adopt a historical view of the rolling web in a more substantive sense. Think
of this shared world of reality-sorting expressions in what we may imagine to be the early
stages of its development, that is, the early stages of the development of language itself.
We do not have to adopt the philosophically parochial supposition that in its early stages
the development of language involved the creation of simple referring and descriptive
atomic terms, enabling us to operate with “moderate-sized specimens of dry goods,” in
J. L. Austin’s words,93 as if we had already analysed the world in which we lived. No doubt,
with such an imagined language, we might develop a fairly successful practice of living a
small life within closely bounded horizons, where “meaningfulness” need do little more
than support our everyday engagement with other people, that is, support a way of life
that is to a large extent a consequence of the few senses and small memory-sizes with
which  we  human  beings  have  been,  to  the  best  of  our  philosophical  and  scientific
understanding, accidentally endowed.
40 Given this experientially brief and narrow life that we may imagine we once led, then it is
no surprise that meaningful contributions to knowledge and understanding may be half-
plausibly  interpretable  as  having,  as  Aristotle  claimed,  a  brief  and  narrow  subject-
predicate form. Perhaps sadly (although there have been many theoretical developments
and  successes),  philosophical  assumptions  since  then  have  often  been  fashioned  as
imitating or mirroring Aristotle’s substance/attribute metaphysics, with much work over
the centuries that has attempted to explain “logic,” “truth,” “reference,” “knowledge”
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and  cognate  concepts  in  terms  of  these  ancient  assumptions,  and  such  assumptions
continue to inform the post-Gottlob Frege predicate logic that many exact philosophers
use today. Pragmatically, it surely has its uses; but answering the epistemic problems of
history  is  not  among  them.  The world,  as  shown  by  historians,  scientists  and
mathematicians,  is  much  bigger  than  that,  and  requires  a  more  expansive  sense  of
“meaningfulness” which is plausibly not translatable into such limited and ancient terms;
the “academic person” has a “discourse many times larger, and he looks before and after
many times as far.”94
41 In the light  of  ancient  and anthropological  discoveries  I  will  offer,  not  necessarily  a
probable, but a possible alternative. Early communication between people, and storage of
what some of us call “information,” seems to have taken place in terms of oral traditions
which primarily took the form of stories or narratives. We might well think that these are
refinements of still earlier linguistic attempts to express what is going on which involve
concepts that we may now think of as “temporally extended” in two ways. First, the
expression is itself “temporally extended” (for it takes time to present or to follow a
narrative), while even the briefest of expressions takes some time to get across, given
what may well be uncertainty over the receptiveness or uptake of the audience. Second,
what  the  expression  is  “about”  may  well  also  be  “temporally  extended,”  for,
comparatively  unanalysed  as  experience  then  is,  it  might  refer  for  example  to
“approaching  flood”  or  “imminent  storm,”  where  a  proto-version  of  what  some
philosophers of history have called a “colligatory concept” is adopted,95 but here we do
not  interpret  such  concepts  as  built  up  from  simpler  “facts”  but  rather  as
epistemologically  prior  to  simple  “facts”  and  involving  a  similarly  large  yet  vague
ontological construction and commitment. We may imagine early peoples,  developing
language as a tool,  trying out such “concepts” to see how useful, how workable, how
predictive, how memorable, these large expressions were for their experience of their
narrow worlds,  later refining them for more exact use where that was pragmatically
possible. We continued to search for “meaning” in our lives in the larger senses of that,
adopting  religious  answers  early  on,  but  eventually  coming  to  use,  for  historical
understanding, comparatively vast concepts such as “Renaissance” or “Enlightenment.”
Such summary terms were adopted not by historians alone but also to characterise their
own situations by, in these examples, Vasari96 and Kant97 respectively.
42 As I  remarked earlier,  for me the epistemic problems of history came before Quine’s
version of pragmatism, and attention to the epistemic dimension of historical inquiry
required me to develop from him the form of pragmatism I have described. I drew on his
pragmatism to help solve the problems I found, and at no point found a more plausible
source. But, being pragmatic, I allow that one day I might find one. My approach has
inherently involved adopting a historical  stance and Quine’s  pragmatism framed and
facilitated this despite the unashamed philosophical stance that in the main he adopted.
Just as he did not touch ethics, so he did not touch history, and in so far as he was a
pragmatist – and the choice of descriptions and redescriptions that is inherent in the web
(among many other features) suggests to me that there is no doubt that he was – it is
implausible to suggest that there is any intrinsic connection between his pragmatism and
philosophical theorising about history in any of the senses of “history.” There may well,
however, be an intrinsic connection between pragmatism more generally and what I have
called  elsewhere  a  “temporal  stance,”98 where  a  “temporal  stance”  attends  to  a
temporally extended object of thought characteristically much shorter than the object of
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a “historical stance,” allowing us as pragmatists to hold importantly fundamental time-
extended  habits  of  human  behaviour.  However,  this  relates  to  the  “everyday,”  to
“commonsense,”  and a  philosophical  understanding of  it  would  not  seem to  require
attention to the philosophical problems of the discipline of historiography. By contrast,
Morton White was a brilliant polymath of a scholarly pragmatic philosopher yet, despite
his  detailed  essays  into  history  and historical  theory,  his  attention to  the  theory  of
history I found completely unhelpful. It was one of those ladders that one had to kick
away after one had climbed it, itself a good pragmatic move. But that is hindsight.
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NOTES
1. See, for example, White 1965.
2. Quine’s entire oeuvre is evidence for this. He did, however, display a fondness for etymology.
See  Quine  1990,  where  the  alphabetically  ordered  entries  jump  from  “Gödel’s  Theorem”  to
“Ideas” with no mention of “History,” “Future” has a place, with a rare (for Quine) reference to
an ethical issue (74-5); “Past,” “Present” and “Time” do not appear. The entry for “Etymology” is
entirely in the present tense,  although see the entry for “Kinship of  Words” for a  historical
conjecture.
3. Strawson (1959: 117). I have presented arguments relating to this quotation in Gorman 2008
and in Gorman 2016. 
4. Here Strawson, and we too for the present, assume that the derivation of historical assertions
from historical evidence involves different skills and considerations from those characteristic of
the discipline of philosophy.
5. This is an observation made about analytical philosophers in general,  and not particularly
about Strawson.
6. Just because some past philosopher wrote that he or she was a “pragmatist” does not mean
that they were, nor that denying it meant that they were not. Peirce famously suggested that he
was a “pragmaticist” rather than a “pragmatist” (Gallie 1966: 22), while Engels reported in 1890
that Marx had said he was not a Marxist.
7. Analogously, that philosophy was not fundamentally distinct from a social science was the
main point made in Winch 1958.
8. “Context” is a shockingly ambiguous term. I address some of its features in Gorman 2016.
9. understanding  ‘context’  as  including  a  range  of  things,  including  the  context  of  other
sentences or a time-extended dialogue or discourse which arose under certain social conditions.
10. Ewing 1935. However, for a famous exception among historians see Skinner 1969.
11. See, however, Macbeth 2014.
12. Winch 1958.
13. Strawson (1971: 24). Emphases in the original.
14. Austin 1971.
15. See Gorman 2011.
16. Is the “world of mathematical ideas” part of this world? Following Plato, perhaps not, but we
can suspend judgement about how far we can agree here with Plato. Nevertheless, mathematics
raises special problems that will not be deal with in the present context. Again, see Macbeth
2014. 
17. Recall Quine’s pragmatic conception that philosophy and science are continuous with each
other: Quine 1961. It seems sure that Quine did not think of himself, a philosopher and logician,
as tolerating science; by contrast, scientists might well, in so far as they accepted his approach,
think of themselves as having to tolerate philosophy.
18. See Gorman 2011.
19. See Gorman 2014.
20. “It must be laid down that a letter retains in a given context the meaning once given to it”
(Geach & Black 1966: 1).
21. “At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions – social, historical,
meteorological, physiological – that will ensure that a word uttered in that place and at that time
will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions,” (Bakhtin 1981:
Glossary ,428).
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22. Recall  Strawson’s  distinction  between  “descriptive”  and  “revolutionary”  metaphysics  in
Strawson (1959: 9). Thomas S. Kuhn had a revolutionary take on meaning in Kuhn 1962; as did
Paul K. Feyerabend in Feyerabend 1968 and Feyerabend 1975.
23. Bradley (1922: 597). Bradley did not think of himself as a pragmatist, and excludes “practice”
from his concerns in that work, Bradley (1922: 17-9 and passim).
24. Bradley (1922: 640). Contrast this with his view in Bradley (1874: 9): “The historical event […]
involves in the first place a judgment. It is ‘objective,’ it is distinguished in itself, and yet it is a
whole.”
25. Mink (1966: 180-1).
26. Bradley (1922: 95).
27. Bradley (1922: 1).
28. Bradley (1922: 1).
29. Pragmatism, it has been so often said, is what “works,” but that, it has also been so often said,
is not much help.
30. I am able now (2016) to characterise or re-describe my ideas in 1970 in a way I did not know,
or perhaps could not have known, at the time and will where appropriate do so. I will, in other
words,  use  on  occasion  what  Danto  (1965:  152  and  generally  chap.  VIII)  called  “narrative
sentences.” His example is “The Thirty Years War began in 1618,” which one could not have
known in 1618. Such sentences describe an earlier event in terms which involve referring to a
later event not knowable at the earlier time, although we need not limit this to “referencing” or
to “events.” Whatever the detail about that, only hindsight enables these to be constructed.
31. This was at Peterhouse, Cambridge, famous at the time for the quality of its historians. My
supervisors were officially Bryce Gallie and Mary Hesse, but among historians Maurice Cowling
took a lead and I found Ian Hacking helpful also.
32. Gorman 1991.
33. Expelled by Plato, too. Walsh (1951: 12).
34. Hume 1754, dominant for decades.
35. Burrow 2007.
36. See, for example, Spencer 2013.
37. He famously admitted to being woken from his dogmatic slumber by David Hume, Kant (1953:
9).
38. “We can regard the history of the human race as the progressive realisation of a rational plan
of nature to bring about a perfect moral community with a perfect political constitution. We,
being rational, can work out this plan, and so help forward our necessary progress towards that
final perfect state” (Kant 1959: 22-34).
39. Gallie (1966: 28-9), with reference to CP 5.189.
40. Helped by my teachers Leon Pompa and W. H. Walsh.
41. Walsh (1951: 15ff).
42. Danto (1965: chapter 1).
43. The assumption that there is a “meaning of history” to be found, particularly an ethical one,
is dubitable. See Geuss 2014.
44. This is a helpfully brief summary from Villa (2013: 89). For the original, see Pompa 2002,
where two other characteristics of Vico’s position are summarised and worth mentioning here: it
“challenges the  traditional  view that  philosophy can lay  claim to  a  historically  independent
viewpoint,” while the New Science was written to demonstrate in practice “his conception of the
philosophical importance of etymology” (endpaper).
45. Popper 1961 and Popper 1945.
46. Gardiner 1952.  Gardiner was one of  my 1973 Cambridge Ph.D.  examiners.  The other was
Quentin Skinner.
47. Walsh (1951: 11ff).
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48. Various works including Collingwood 1946.
49. Various works including Bradley 1874.
50. Butterfield 1931.
51. Unless the historian were a historian of science like Kuhn, but no “proper” historian I knew
would have accepted him as a member of their discipline. Reflection on Kuhn’s work required
philosophy of science, not philosophy of history.
52. It took a while for a distinctive contribution to be made here: Bayesian decision theory was






58. See, for example, Davidson 1968.
59. Danto (1965: chap. VIII).  Danto’s subsequent career as a philosopher of aesthetics and art
critic almost proved the point,  historically if  not philosophically. Pragmatically,  I  here forget
undergraduate philosophical warnings that one should not engage in ad hominem reasoning.
60. After I left Cambridge I became aware of White 1973, in which aesthetics played an epistemic
role. It would not have helped me if I had known of such material in 1970, as I explain in Gorman
2013b. 
61. Kuhn 1962; Quine 1961; Quine 1960; Feyerabend 1968.
62. Hempel acknowledged the merits of Kuhn’s history-based philosophy of science when he
gave his paper “Problems in the empiricist construal of theories” [“not to be quoted in print”] at
a History and Philosophy of Science Seminar, Cambridge, 4th November 1971.
63. “History, Religion, and Freedom in the Thought of Herbert Butterfield, Michael Oakeshott,
and Maurice Cowling,” September 2016. 
64. See, for example, Edmonds & Eidinow 2001. Such “threats” are rare enough in philosophy to
warrant a book. We might well be flooded with such books about historians, if it were thought to
be a matter of comment.
65. Taylor 1965.
66. The Times report, 18th September 1945.
67. Taylor (1965: Note B, 647-8).
68. Taylor (1965: 648).
69. Bradley (1922: 640).
70. I stress this, as “context,” earlier noted as ambiguous, is here limited in its reference, and
does not refer to other notions of “context,” and in particular not to what some historians mean
by it as the “religious, political, and economic factors” involved. See Skinner 1969.
71. Developed for my PhD thesis, the construction is explained in Gorman 1998, where many
other constructions permitted the investigation of associated problems. I argued for the need to
recover  the  rational  standards  which  would  have  to  be  involved  to  make  sense  of  the
“objectivity” or “comparative objectivity” of  selection in historical  accounts.  Further lengthy
analysis  of  these  matters  was  given  in  Gorman  1982,  which  used  Michael  Dummett’s
understanding of antirealism.
72. Scott (1910: xi). I say more about this in Gorman 2014.
73. Particularly relevant might be Hempel’s deductive-nomological model of causal explanation.
74. Bradley’s view in 1874 was: “[…] it is clear to us that we are concerned with a number of
judgments, […] it is not less clear that these many judgments are united, and, as it were, resolved
in a single judgment which answers to the whole event. This one judgment comprehends in itself
the many judgments; it must be looked on as their result, or in other words it is a conclusion.”
(Bradley  1874:  9-10).  See,  for  later  work  on  the  argumentative  structure  of  historiography,
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Kuukkanen (2015: 86-96, 157-67). His is in many ways a pragmatic position (65-6, 138-47). See
Roth 2016.
75. Nagel (1961: 580-1 and note 25).
76. Gorman (1998: 331).
77. Gorman 1998.
78. Quine (1961: 42). I began to follow through this material in Gorman 1982 and in Gorman 2008.
79. I asked Quine in about 1974 why he assumed the “science” which he took to be continuous
with his philosophy was physics or psychology and not sociology, but got no useful answer. That
it might be history rather than social science seemed to be one thought too far, and I did not
mention it to him.
80. Rorty 1982. 
81. Berlin (1980: 115). Berlin continued here, “It is this network of our most general assumptions,
called commonsense knowledge, that historians to a greater degree than scientists are bound, at
least initially, to take for granted.” 
82. Quine (1961: 43).
83. Quine (1961: 43).
84. Quine (1961: 42).
85. This is in effect Quine’s argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction given in Quine
1961. In practice rather than principle there are limitations – often strong limitations – on the
available room for adjustment, limitations that a pragmatic approach can recover. Moral beliefs,
in so far as they can be held true (for expressivism might be the best explanation here), have the
same status  as  factual  beliefs  on this  approach,  and equally  permit  unlimited adjustment  in
principle. It follows that there is no empirical warrant for the fact-value distinction, and thus,
again given empiricism, no epistemological justification for that distinction. Quine himself does
not consider questions of value, however.
86. Quine (1960: 68ff and passim).
87. Quine (1961: 43).
88. Gorman (1998: 327).
89. Bradley (1922: 640).
90. Quine (1960:  91).  “Learn” here does  not  mean “discovering,”  for  our concepts  have to  be
created, often on the basis of lengthy, even aesthetic, experience. 
91. See Gorman 2013a and Gorman 2011.
92. Hence the title of my first book, Gorman 1982.
93. Austin (1962: 8).
94. Cornford (1908: 14).
95. The idea comes from Whewell 1840, and is used by Walsh to speak of the historian’s search
for “dominant concepts” by which to “illuminate his facts.” Walsh (1951: 24ff and 61). See also
Mink 1966 and Kuukkanen (2015: chap. 6).
96. Vasari 1550.
97. Kant 1784.
98. See Gorman 2011.
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ABSTRACTS
I  present  the history  of  philosophy,  and history  more  generally,  as  a  context  of  ideas,  with
respect to which philosophers and historians share concerns about the meaning of the texts they
both use, and where for some there is a principled contrast between seeing meaning in quasi-
mathematical terms (“a philosophical stance”) or in terms of context (“a historical stance”). I
introduce this imagined (but not imaginary) world of ideas as temporally extended. Returning to
my  early  research  into  the  epistemic  problems  of  historiography,  I  present  my  view  that
foundational was meaningful language in a shared world, and I display some difficulties found in
handling the “wholeness” of historical accounts. I came to realise that it was epistemic opposition
between historical accounts that mattered. I concluded that analytical philosophy was wrong to
assume that individual sentences were free-standing meaningful units that could be juxtaposed
with  others  at  whim,  and  that  an  understanding  of  the  rational  grounds  for  determining
relevance was needed. In order to make sense of this I used Quine’s conception of the “web of
belief,” and noted that a historical account could be treated as a “unit of empirical significance”
in his terms. I observe that, although the epistemic problems of history arose for me before I
considered  his  pragmatic  position,  nevertheless  attention  to  those  problems  required  me to
adopt  the  Quine-based  form of  pragmatism I  describe.  I came to  realise  that  I  had  wrongly
adopted  a  synchronic  view  of  the  Quinean  web,  thereby  adopting  a  “philosophical  stance.”
Rather, the web should be conceived in diachronic terms as a rolling web, so forming history itself.
It is wrong to think that language started in atomistic terms so that, following Aristotle, it first
consisted  of  simple  concepts  forming  sentences  of  brief  and  narrow  subject-predicate  form.
Instead,  early  communications  took  the  form  of  oral  traditions  usually  in  narrative  form.
Meaningful wholes such as historical accounts are conceptually prior to atomistic sentences and
need  to  be  seen  in  extended  temporal  terms,  so  that  an  Aristotelian  subject-predicate
metaphysics  is  implausible.  Quine’s  pragmatism  framed  and  facilitated  my  historical  stance
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